Abstract: Rejecting notions of inherent violence, this article focuses upon the large numbers of Algerians from the French organised anti-FLN Militias who were subjected to reprisals after the French exit from Algeria in 1962. Estimates of those killed range from 10,000 to 150,000, and the violence is justifiably described as brutal. The specificity of this violence has only emerged as a field of enquiry since the 1980s. Initially this stemmed from the impact of eyewitness accounts, combined with the emergence of organised pressure groups in France. Collectively these new voices spoke out against simplistic interpretations that reduced these Militias to pro-French villains in a heroic decolonisation narrative -a perspective reinforced by the recent historical research of Pierre Daum, François-Xavier Hautreux, Mohand Hamoumou and Michel Roux. This article draws upon this historiography, but it also moves beyond it to situate Algeria within a global history of violence and to challenge interpretations that explain this violence solely in terms of a Franco-Algerian dynamic. Instead, the 1962 massacres must be understood in terms of broader global processes of violence that connect these generic contexts to the specificity of the Algerian case.
were bound hand and foot and dragged behind horses until they died. 2 In July in the Aurès
Mountains at M'chouneche, a captain in the auxiliary forces had his eyes gouged out before being castrated and then dragged before the local population for ten days until he died. 3 This was retribution carried out against Muslim Militias in the wake of Algerian independence in July 1962. By any measure these were acts of extreme bloodshed: the aim was not death in itself, but death by protracted physical humiliation. Through symbolic violence, the perpetrators wanted to mark these Muslims out as traitors who had no place in the new nation state.
It can become tempting to interpret this violence in pathological, a-historical terms: the result of an Algerian mind-set that is inherently attuned to bloodshed. It can become tempting, too, to see this retribution simply as the result of a uniquely violent Franco-Algerian dynamic.
This article contests such interpretations. It aims instead to situate the Algerian case within a global history of violence and to challenge explanations of violence that rest solely in the dynamic of Franco-Algerian relations, while offering a historically grounded framework for understanding violence that studiously avoids prejudice. It is a response to Laleh Khalilli's call, published in November 2013, for a scholarly conversation that challenges a hysterical mainstream narrative which 'locates the sources of violence in or emanating from the region in Islam(ism) or attributes it to some half-baked but remarkably persistent cultural explanations (tribalism, ancient hatreds, cycles of violence, etc) which uncomfortably echo the racism of an earlier scholarly era.' 4 Specifically, she argued, this analysis must understand 'the political and sociological processes and relations that produce violence, the form violence takes, the embedding (or dis-embedding) of violence in law and procedure, and the after-effects of violence. 5 It must also encompass the strategic choices of oppositional movements (guerrilla warfare, violent revolutionary action, anticolonial warfare) as well as the violence wielded by states and empires (war, policing, incarceration, torture). Equally, she continued, it must challenge hackneyed myths by bringing the region into conversation with those working on other geographical areas such as, she underlined, Allen Feldman on conflict in Northern Ireland; Katherine Verdery's ethnography of the politics of dead bodies in Eastern Europe; and Veena
Das's work on gendering of violence in India. 6 Any consideration of violence in the Middle East and North Africa must also engage with the insights of Helen Graham's history of the Spanish Civil War. Graham views this struggle as part of a wider European pattern of violence between 1936 and 1947 -one that was defined by a war of intimate enemies and local massacres where civilians were killed by their own compatriots. In explaining the endemic violence in the Spanish Civil War, she warns against de-historicized categories that see Spain as 'violent and southern.' 7 Such decontextualisation, she continues, is fatal for the historian because it can lead to 'a mesmerising focus on the acts of lethal violence themselves which fail singularly to place in their proper historical context either the motives or the forms of violence. 8 Instead, the Spanish Civil War must be seen as a pivotal episode in Europe's 'dark twentieth century':
that is, in the story of how, not so long ago, the mass killing of civilians became the brutal medium through which European societies came to terms with structure shattering forms of change. 9 Graham's approach is richly suggestive for historians working on the Middle East and North Africa because it shows how violence in any area must be located in much broader patterns of cause and effect.
Similarly, Donald Bloxham and Robert Gerwarth's recent work on political violence in
Europe highlights the need to guard against the "socio-cultural fatalism" that portrays some areas (e.g. the Balkans and the Caucasus) as inherently more violent than others (e.g.
Scandinavia)
. 10 The contributors to the Bloxham and Gerwarth volume also challenge the Beyond this propaganda aspect, turning FLN prisoners had another military goal. French offices knew that their inside knowledge was a precious weapon, so some prisoners were recruited into harki units or used to infiltrate the FLN. 28 In part these prisoners were turned by the power of argument. They were convinced of the sincerity of French promises or at least the futility of armed struggle. But there was also manipulation. As prisoners they were in a weak position and French officers ruthlessly exploited this power relationship. In the case of the thirteen year old Saïd Ferdi he was captured by the French in 1959. 29 He was then given a choice: either work for the French army or his father would be tortured. Thereafter he was locked into a terrible logic. He understood that he had to fight because if he was captured by the FLN, he would be executed as a traitor.
Saïd Ferdi was indicative of a much larger truth: how counter-insurgency strategy fed off the vulnerability of Algerian society in the mid to late 1950s. Extreme poverty, allied to the fact that by 1959 two million Algerians had been relocated into camps, meant that a dependency culture was endemic. 30 In this context the French army knew that the promise of food and money could recruit allies in the first instance.
The FLN activist and historian Mohammed Harbi has underlined the complexity of harki history. He first grasped this complexity when imprisoned after the June 1965 military coup. 31 Many fellow prisoners were harkis and talking to them he began to understand that it was wrong to think just in terms of a black-and-white story of resistance and collaboration, Moreover, he used his prestige as a regional leader to win over his tribe to the French cause.
Through meetings he convinced the local peasantry that they would profit from a French victory, thereby ensuring that membership of the Beni Boudouane became synonymous with a pro-French position. 33 For many more rural Algerians much lower down the social scale joining the harkis was a way out of crushing poverty through the provision of a regular income. Often, given the high levels of illiteracy, these recruits had little clear idea what exactly they were enlisting for.
Dalia Kerchouche, for example, explains how in 1956 her 29 year-old father, needing to feed three small children, joined the local police in the Ouarsenis region where, as has just been noted, the FLN was weak. 34 Immediately he was posted to Kabylia where the FLN was strong and in the ensuing months he came to gradually realise that he was not involved in police work but full scale warfare where his unit was being used to isolate the civilians from the FLN.
In many cases harki recruitment was about physical survival -it was a way of securing protection from French Army exactions as well as using the French Army to shield them from FLN violence that aimed to control the Muslim population. This last dimension, understanding harki recruitment as a reaction to FLN ruthlessness, is a very strong aspect of harki memoirs and testimonies. 35 But it was also recognised by Mohammed Harbi in his ground breaking analysis of the interior politics of the FLN, published in 1980. For him the striking increase in harki numbers in 1957 was in part because FLN violence drove Algerians into the arms of the French army. 36 Again in 2003 he admitted that he FLN strategy on the ground was politically unsophisticated and brutal, alienating many pro-independence Algerians who began to fear the FLN methods. 37 As one harki remembered:
You get up one morning and you discover that your neighbour has had his throat cut during the night. You, you know him, your neighbour for a long time. You do not understand why he has been killed. You understand only that you must not ask questions…So, in the beginning, you say yourself to reassure you: 'It is astonishing but the moudjahidin know undoubtedly what they are doing. The men killed were perhaps playing a double game.' And then after a while, with all these deaths, the old people, the youngsters fifteen or sixteen years old, you say to yourself there is something not right here, that tomorrow it could be your turn, like that, for nothing. 38 On another level of complexity, some recruits became involved in a double-game. Gaining
French confidence gave them greater freedom to aid the FLN food, financial support, information. This was because the FLN and the harkis were not two separate spheres. In some cases they did have relatives in the FLN and this resulted in covert support. This nether world is difficult to quantify although Michel Roux has calculated that about forty per cent of recruits were involved in aiding the FLN in some way and certainly some French army officers misgivings about reliability. 39 This is why, even if desertions until late 1961 desertions were strikingly small, just 3000, the harkis were employed on a monthly contract because if they were thought to be colluding with the FLN they could be simply laid off. In 1959 in Thiers in south Kabylia, for example, 200 out of a unit of 450 not renewed because suspected that working with the FLN.
Finally, it is important to underline the large variations in personal engagement. Some harkis were highly committed. This was the case of the Commando Georges counterinsurgency unit, as well the units that were used in anti-FLN repression in Paris in 1961. 40 Others, though, were in harki units only for a few months, weeks or days even. In many case this momentary engagement was the product of complicated micro-histories as individuals navigated the complex, constantly evolving, and highly dangerous local politics of rural Algeria.
The massacres
In May 1958 a political crisis brought on by the Algerian War led to the collapse of the If it was up to me, you, the Beni Boudouane who rallied en masse to the settlers, I would kill you all. 46 reality the lives of him and his family were in danger. He now made preparations to leave for
France.
This meant that the second phase began with independence on 5 July. Now the harkis were truly exposed particularly because the movement of pro-French Algerians had been closely monitored by new Algerian government in waiting. In Akbou, Jean-Marie Robert reported how initially the FLN message was conciliatory. 47 FLN tracts claimed that the past was forgotten. He himself was assured by FLN representatives that Muslim administrators and politicians would not be harmed. 48 Yet, he concluded, in many cases this was a ruse because in this area of rural Kabylia the massacres begin in earnest end of July. At this point it was very much a movement from below, motivated by a surge in patriotic anger produced by independence.. There was no overall coordination. Popular tribunals sprung up to enact local micro-histories of revenge where some were put into camps, some were executed en masse while others were subjected to systematic humiliation lasting several days. 49 This opened the way to the final phase: an uneasy peace that lasted until the mid-1960s.
Momentarily, the violence could flare up, as in Souk-Ahras on the Tunisia border in January 1964. There were also some reprisals in France but overall there was a sharp decline in the violence and in 1965 20,000 harkis were released. 51 During this period too discrimination on the basis of anti-national behaviour was enshrined in the law while property of those deemed to have taken a pro-French position was confiscated. However, in contrast to France after World War Two, this was the limit of legal punishment. Revenge never translated into major trials, although this was partly because the major figures escaped to France.
This violence had a strong class and gender character. Most of the victims were from the poor, largely illiterate, rural peasantry and male who had served in harki units, although a minority were a more privileged strata of administrators and local politicians who were being punished for benefitting from the push for great equality and more Muslim representation since 1956. 52 A small number women were targeted but here rather than murder violence generally took the form of sexual humiliation such as rape, head shaving or, in the case of those from the local elite forced marriages with men of lower social standing. Arriving at the numbers killed is difficult, however. One French Army report dated 13 August 1962 put the figure killed in hundreds and identified the violence as being particularly concentrated in the east and south of Algiers. 53 But it also recognised this calculation was speculative, firstly because the FLN was covering up these killings, and secondly because they were being carried out in remoter rural areas where there were few French troops and it was difficult to get precise intelligence. Ever since there has been a problem of calculating violence, largely because the figures have become ideological, bound up with political struggles pursued by harki community groups in France. 57 In contrast, amongst professional historians Benjamin Stora has cited 10,000 to 25,000, Gilbert Meynier has estimated 30,000, while Mohand Hamoumou has talked of 150,000. 58 What is easier to quantify is the number who escaped to France. Although de
Gaulle was hostile to a mass influx of harkis, the government did put in place makeshift reception camps to receive those most at risk before which was estimated at 10,500. 
Algeria 1962
How do we understand of the character and extent of Algeria's violence in 1962? On the French side the drivers were state power combined with nationalism, imperialism and a chaotic end of empire scenario. Seen in these terms the anti-harki violence was the result of a long colonial violence deployed by the state that was intensified by the fact that Algeria was an integral part of the Republic as well as the eight year duration of the Algerian War, one of the longest and bloodiest episodes in the decolonisation process. 61 The French state felt threatened both in terms of nation-state sovereignty and global imperial interests. This is why it deployed huge violence that led to the death of 141,000 Algerians in an asymmetrical war where the two sides were ill matched in terms of resources. a response to original colonial violence. 63 But although some retribution was directed towards the departing settlers, most concentrated upon the harkis. They became the objects of mirror violence par excellence because, left behind by the French state, they were the easiest targets for retribution.
As such the massacres were the product of an end of empire scenario that was utterly chaotic. The coordinated exit envisaged by the French-FLN Accords was quickly swept aside and the ensuing anarchy meant that imagined revenge could be translated into actual revenge.
Algeria was an uncontrolled space during the summer of 1962 which became the cover for settling of accounts in the remote mountainous regions to the south of the capitol and eastern part of the country as the French army underlined on 13 August 1962:
This repression…takes a form of extreme violence, going from degrading bullying to summary executions and torture. One can only confirm that these exactions are ordered by the wilaya commanders, but all is happening as if the FLN is profiting from the present period of anarchy in order to carry out against Algerians who served for France a purge which it leaves the responsibility to the lower echelons. 65 It also stemmed from the fact that de Gaulle did not see the harkis as a coherent group, discounting in a government meeting on 3 April 1962 as 'a magma which had served no purpose, and which it was necessary to get rid of without delay'. 66 This prejudice had a clear class complexion. For de Gaulle only those who he saw as having successfully assimilated, such as the politician Bachaga Boualam, could be accepted in.
However, the majority could not be because they were Algerian who would find it impossible to adapt to French culture and would represent an economic burden. There was the suspicion too that some harkis might be sympathetic to settler terrorism that was threatening the French state, while at the same time the French government did not want to jeopardise future relations with the Algerian state by allowing in potential opponents to that state. As a consequence little was done for rural peasantry who bore the brunt of the violence. Even when knowledge of the massacres became impossible of the French government to deny by August 1962, the authorities set out strict guidelines stipulating that the French units could not actively search out threatened harkis. They had to wait until the harkis came to the barracks themselves and then they had to carefully screened. 67 On the FLN side, violence was shaped by a mixture of nationalism and state-making, coloured by a war culture as well as a belief in the purification of society. Right from the outset all these elements were at the centre FLN strategy. Within the '1 November 1954
Declaration' violence was not a political lever. 68 It was how national liberation was going to be achieved. Algerians had a national duty to mobilise behind the FLN in a peoples' war and those who did not would be treated as traitors to be liquidated. Within this framework FLN militants became obsessed with the idea that the greatest danger was pro-French Algerians; a fear that was fuelled by the uncertain conditions of clandestine warfare that made rumour rife and produced constant purges of supposed collaborators.
This violent, polarised nationalism was shaped by models of French nationalism and
French revolutionary culture, both in terms of a peoples' war of patriots versus enemies and the desire for a centrally controlled nation-state. It was derived more recently from the examples anti-colonial nationalism of the Irish War of Independence, seen like Algeria to be national struggle to recover land and religious identity, and the Vietnamese struggle against the French in the Indochina War. At the same time it drew upon a deep seated rural millenarianism which envisaged the end of French colonialism in terms of a climatic violent act. 69 The role of the FLN, therefore, was not mass action. It was about hardened, uncompromising, masculine vanguard that would set this millenarianism alight through terrorism.
That said at certain moments FLN documents could be conciliatory. In autumn 1959
slogans to be diffused as graffiti or on tracts claimed that there was a place for the harkis in the National Liberation Army (ALN): 'the colonialists despise you, the GPRA (The Algerian Provisional Government Republic) will restore to you dignity, Honour and liberty, join the ALN.' 70 The same language was also aimed at Algerian conscripts in the French Army in a Those who link their future to the moribund mechanism of colonialism are making a bad calculation. Before classing you amongst those who have gone astray, we are offering you one more chance to retake the path of Honour. Misfortune to those who stubbornly persist against our liberation movement. Today or later or anywhere the judgement of the ALN tribunals will be carried out. The traitors condemned to death will not escape the blows of our fedayeens (commandos). Will France take you?...She will well and truly abandon you, and you will be like a blind man in the middle of the desert, trying in vain to find your path. 76 Yet, as Algeria entered the endgame some FLN language was reconciliatory. One directive by Ben Tobbal, the Interior Minister in the Provisional Government, from January 1961 underlined the need to multiply contacts with the harkis and by 'a work of persuasion'
bring them over to the ALN ranks. 77 He was frank that many were 'bastards' but many too had become harkis through 'weakness' or 'pressure from the enemy.' 78 In the weeks following Nobody ignores their shameful and criminal behaviour…If the Revolution has condemned them, the fact remains that the people will strike them and will always continue to reject them. Nevertheless, the cease-fire is not peace, we will use tact and act with flexibility in order to win them over provisionally in order not to give them the opportunity to play the game of the enemy…Their final judgement will take place in a free and independent Algeria before God and the people will then be responsible for fate…They will be written down on a black list which must be that must be kept thoroughly. On our heroes we will build a glory And on our bodies we will go up to immortality, On our hearts, we will build an army And of our hope we will raise the standard.
Face of the Release, we lent oath to you And we swore to die so that Algeria lives 
Conclusion: Towards an emotional history of decolonisation
An emotional history of the Algerian War is still to be written, although clearly personal and political emotions were at the crux of the conflict. This conclusion will point towards how such a history might be envisaged by opening up the question of the emotional economy that framed the Algerian violence of 1962. In particular it will focus upon the concept of the 'emotional community' -that is the understanding of the emotional states of other people, in order to situate the particular context for the massacres. to the extent of feeling to be fully French citizens, most empathised emotionally with Algerian nationalism. In this context de Gaulle underlined the fact that his task as a political leader was to make decisions above emotion or romanticism. Whether performing in cabinet or on television, he projected a particular type of political masculinity that encoded detachment, level headedness and realism. 85 In contrast both to the Fourth Republic, which he derided as weak and divided, and to pro-French Algeria settlers, which he attacked as pursuing narrow interests, he conceptualised himself and the new Fifth Republic as strong, resolute and forward looking.
Crucially he saw himself as speaking from an elevated position above the fray which allowed him to understand the higher interests of the French state and then communicate these interests through a series of direct television and radio addresses to the French people. As such he conceptualised the end of French Algeria and decolonisation in general as a victory for modernisation, the process by which France married the twentieth century, and therefore he saw the harkis as losers to be sacrificed. In terms of 'emotional community' he did not see them as French and showed indifference to their plight, openly admitting that they would suffer. 86 Indeed, in cabinet he ruthlessly exploited his personal political legitimacy to face down ministers over the issue in a cabinet meeting on 25 July 1962:
We cannot agree to take all Muslims who come here declaring that they do not agree with the Algerian government. The term repatriate obviously does not apply to Muslims; they are not returning to the land of their fathers. In their case they would be refugees. 87 Ministers who disagreed did not continue the argument. Intimidated by de Gaulle's outburst, they bowed their heads in shame. However, within sections of the army there was anger at de
Gaulle's abandonment. 88 This led to disobedient clandestine action which, driven by notions of military honour, brought large numbers of harkis to France. Likewise at the end of June
French newspaper Combat published a public appeal to give political refuge to the harkis that called upon French people to write to parties and trade-unions demanding action. 89 This intellectual campaign failed to produce a large-scale emotional response because most French people followed de Gaulle's logic. By 1962 they just wanted an end to the Algerian War and the dominant mood was relief tempered by indifference and hostility to the partisans of French Algeria. In the case of the settlers, this hostility was balanced by a sense that they were French and could ultimately be integrated. 90 In contrast most saw the harkis as too different culturally and ethnically. They did not see them as fellow citizens to be taken in or allies to be protected. Rather, there was the suspicion that the harkis were sympathetic to settler terrorism and hence a potential internal threat to the unity of the nation: an emotional framework which, remembering the Liberation in 1944, also saw them as collaborators whose suffering was a consequence of the wrong political choices. The massacres, therefore, were the result of a double purification process. Both de Gaulle and the FLN wanted to cleanse the harkis from their respective nations.
Returning to the revisionist approach to the history of political violence offered by period, all the product of a deeper history of imperialism, racism, and subjugation. As Khalilli reminds us, 92 violence will never be fully understood unless it is freed from its localised obsessions and set in a broader comparative and global frame. 
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